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Abstract
Employing a general equilibrium framework, Blackorby and Murty [2007] prove that,
with a monopoly and under one hundred percent proﬁt taxation and uniform lump-sum
transfers, the utility possibility sets of economies with unit and ad valorem taxes are iden-
tical. This welfare-equivalence is in contrast to most previous studies, which demonstrate
the superiority of the ad valorem tax in a partial equilibrium framework. In this paper we
relax the assumption of one hundred percent proﬁt taxation and allow the consumers to
receive proﬁt incomes from ownership of shares in the monopoly ﬁrm. We ﬁnd that, under
certain regularity conditions, for any ﬁxed vector of proﬁt shares, the utility possibility sets
of economies with unit and ad valorem taxes are not generally identical. But it does not
imply that one completely dominates the other. Rather, the two utility possibility frontiers
cross each other. Additionally, employing a standard partial equilibrium welfare analysis,
we show that the Marshallian social surpluses resulting from the two tax structures are
identical when the government can implement unrestricted transfers.
JEL classiﬁcation: H21
Keywords: Ad Valorem taxes, unit taxes, monopoly, private ownership economy, general
equilibrium, second-best Pareto optimality.
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Unit Versus Ad Valorem Taxes:
The Private Ownership of Monopoly In General Equilibrium
by
Charles Blackorby and Sushama Murty
1. Introduction
In a recent paper1 we showed, in the context of a general equilibrium model with a
monopoly sector, that the utility possibility frontier in the face of ad valorem taxes is
identical to the utility possibility frontier with unit taxes. This result is contrary to
almost all of the previous literature, which demonstrates the welfare superiority of the
ad valorem tax.2 The characteristic of Blackorby and Murty [2007] model that generates
the contradictory result is the assumption that the government levied proﬁt taxes of one
hundred percent rebating any resulting surplus as a uniform lump-sum transfer (also called
a demogrant), which is a standard assumption in the general equilibrium literature on
indirect taxes.3
It could be argued that the diﬀerences in the earlier results and Blackorby and Murty
[2007] are because, in contrast to the general equilibrium approach of the latter paper,
much of the earlier literature employs a partial-equilibrium framework. The models in
this literature are usually silent about the end use of the monopolist’s proﬁt and the
government’s revenue. For this reason, perhaps, these analyses could be interpreted as
being performed in an institutional structure where the government has control of and can
do unrestricted redistribution of the available economic resources among consumers.4
Suits and Musgrave [1955] showed that for every ad valorem tax, there exists an
equivalent unit tax that can support the proﬁt maximizing output of the monopolist under
the ad valorem tax, and vice-versa. The asymmetry between the unit and the ad valorem
taxes arises because the monopolist’s proﬁts and the government’s indirect tax revenues
under an ad valorem tax and the equivalent unit tax are not equal.5 Blackorby and Murty
[2007] showed, however, that the sum of the government’s revenue and monopoly proﬁt
does not change in the move from the ad valorem tax to the equivalent unit-tax.
This must imply that, even in a standard partial equilibrium welfare analysis con-
ducted in an institutional setting where the government can implement personalized lump-
sum transfers, the Marshallian social surpluses should be the same across both the tax
systems. This result seems not to have been demonstrated by the earlier literature.
1 Blackorby and Murty [2007].
2 See Cournot [1838, 1960], Wicksell [1896, 1959], Suits and Musgrave [1955], Skeath and Trandel
[1994], Keen [1998], and Delipalla and Keen [1992]. Lockwood [2004] is an exception.
3 See, for example, Guesnerie [1995] and Guesnerie and Laﬀont [1978].
4 I.e., it can implement personalized lump-sum transfers.
5 If the ad valorem tax is positive, the government revenue (the monopoly proﬁt) is higher (lower)
under the ad valorem tax as compared to the equivalent unit tax.
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This must also imply that, in an institutional setting where the government’s redis-
tributive ability is constrained and the total governmental revenue from proﬁt and indirect
taxation is rebated to consumers as uniform lump-sum transfers, the ad valorem tax and
the equivalent unit tax result in, not only identical monopoly output and consumer prices,
but also identical consumer incomes and demands. Thus, every ad valorem-tax equilib-
rium also has a unit-tax equilibrium representation. The converse is also true. This is
the welfare equivalence of ad valorem and unit taxes demonstrated in the Blackorby and
Murty model.
In this paper we relax the assumption that government can tax the proﬁts of ﬁrms,
and allow consumers to beneﬁt directly from proﬁt incomes from their ownership of shares
in ﬁrms. The problem raised by private ownership is that, given that the monopolist’s
proﬁts and the government’s indirect tax revenues under an ad valorem tax and the equiv-
alent unit-tax are diﬀerent, for a ﬁxed vector of proﬁt shares, the proﬁt incomes and the
demogrant incomes of the consumers change when moving from a system of ad valorem
taxes to an equivalent system of unit taxes; hence, in general, a given ad valorem-tax equi-
librium is not a unit-tax equilibrium of the same private ownership economy. Thus, there
is no direct way to compare the set of unit-tax equilibria with the set of ad valorem-tax
equilibria for a given private ownership economy. To circumvent this problems, in this
paper, we have resorted to an indirect and somewhat novel procedure which draws heav-
ily on earlier work in second-best economies by Guesnerie [1980] and Quinzi [1992] in a
somewhat diﬀerent context. Our method exploits the Suits and Musgrave result and the
continuity of the diﬀerence in the consumer incomes under unit (respectively, ad valorem)
taxes and equivalent ad valorem (respectively, unit) taxes.
In this paper, we ﬁrst conduct a standard partial equilibrium welfare analysis em-
ploying an example with quasi-linear preference to demonstrate the equivalence of the
Marshallian social surpluses that result from unit and ad valorem taxation of a monopoly
when the government can do unrestricted personalized transfers. We also use this simple
example to demonstrate the central problem created by private-ownership in the welfare
comparison of unit and ad valorem taxes when there are restrictions of government’s redis-
tributive ability, namely, it can only implement a demogrant. Further, we use this example
to outline the strategy that we adopt in this paper to facilitate such a comparison and
show that it works for our example. The rest of the paper provides the proof of the above
claim in a rather general model.
Our main result is that, under certain regularity assumptions, private ownership of
the monopoly ﬁrm implies that the unit-tax utility possibility frontier and the ad valorem
utility possibility frontier must cross each other. That is, there is a region where unit
taxes Pareto dominate ad valorem taxes and another where ad valorem taxes dominate
unit taxes.
2. A Two-Good Example
Consider a two-good economy, where the good indexed by zero is supplied by a
monopoly, while the unindexed good is a non-produced good that is consumed by the
consumers and used as an input by the monopoly.
2Unit Versus Ad Valorem Taxes: Private Ownership and GE.Monopoly. November 13, 2010
2.1. Preferences and technology.
Suppose there are H consumers in the economy. Each consumer h has quasi-linear
preferences that are linear in the non-produced good, which are represented by utility func-








, 0 ≤ xh
0 ≤ bh
2 , xh ≥ 0. Then the individual
and aggregate Marshallian demands for the monopoly good are independent of consumer
incomes and the aggregate demand for the non-produced good depends only upon the ag-
gregate income and not upon its distribution. Thus, the individual and aggregate demand






























h bh. Assume also that the monopolist faces constant marginal costs, so that
his cost function is C(yu
0,q) = cqyu
0. His demand for input is thus cyu
0. This framework
lends itself to a usual partial equilibrium welfare analysis.7
2.2. The case of unit taxation and personalized lump-sum transfers.
Consider the case of an economy where (i) the government can implement a unit tax
on the monopolist, (ii) the monopolist takes the price of the input as given, (iii) the initial
endowment of the input is ω, (iv) there is no initial endowment of the monopoly good,
(v) there is no tax on the competitive commodity, and (vi) government has full discretion
to distribute, as personalized lump-sum transfers (wh), its revenue from taxation of the
monopoly good, the monopolist’s proﬁts8, and the endowment of the non-produced good
that is unused by the monopolist . If the monopolist is subject to a unit tax t0 then the
net-of-tax (producer) price that he receives is pu







0 + t0,q) − cx0 (pu
0 + t0,q)q, (2.3)
which yields the proﬁt maximizing price, quantity, and proﬁts of the monopolist and the




b − Ht0 + Hcq
2H
, yu
0 = x0 (q0,q) =




(b − Hcq − Ht0)
2
8H
, and q0 = Pu
0 (t0,q) + t0 =




6 We use the notation  wh  is used to denote a vector (w1,...,wH).
7 See, for example, Chapter 10 in Mas-Colell et al [1995].
8 I.e., it can implement one-hundred percent taxation of proﬁts
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An equilibrium in this economy with taxation of monopoly proﬁts, unit taxation of
the monopoly good, and personalized lump-sum transfer is described below:
x0(pu








0 + t0,q,wh) = ω − cyu
0.
(2.6)
It follows from Walras law that at any such equilibrium, the government’s budget is bal-
anced:  
h
wh = Πmu(t0,q) + t0yu
0 + qω
=




(2.6) is a system of 3 equations in 4+H unknowns, namely, pu
0,yu
0,q,t0,w1,...,wH. Also
it is homogeneous of degree zero in pu
0,q,t0,w1,...,wH. Hence it admits a harmless nor-
malization, say q = 1. The non-produced good then can be interpreted as a numeraire
commodity. With this normalization, there are H degrees of freedom in choosing tax
equilibria in this economy. For example, an equilibrium speciﬁed by (2.6) is uniquely




8H + ω, i.e., ﬁxing these variables ﬁxes the equilibrium








b − Ht0 + Hc
2H
wH =







Thus, equilibria described by (2.6) are fully parametrized by the H variables t0, w1,...,wH−1.
In particular, note that if we ﬁx t0, we get a whole set of equilibria corresponding to dif-
ferent distributions of the total income. In each of these equilibria, since t0 is ﬁxed, (2.8)
implies that pu
0, the individual and aggregate demands for the monopoly good (and hence
the individual and aggregate expenditure on the monopoly good), and the demands for
input by the monopolist are the same as these variables are independent of consumer
incomes. The total amount of the numeraire good that is available for distribution to
consumers is the initial endowment of this good minus the amount used as input by the
monopolist:
 
h ωh − cyu
0 = ω −
c[b−Hc−Ht0]
4 . Hence, these equilibria will diﬀer only
with respect to consumptions of (and expenditures on) the numeraire good by diﬀerent
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consumers. The quasi-linear structure of the preferences implies that equilibrium allo-
cation corresponding to a given t0 are obtained by transferring the available amount of
the numeraire good unit for unit between consumers. Depending on the amount of the
numeraire good, xh, that he receives, the utility of consumer h for a ﬁxed t0 is given by
uh =
(2bhH−b−Ht0−Hc)(2bhH+b+Ht0+Hc)
16H2 + xh. We deﬁne the frontier of equilibrium utility
proﬁles of this economy that are made possible when t0 is ﬁxed as
Uu (t0) := { u1,...,uH | ∀ h = 1,...,H,∃ xh ≥ 0 such that
 
h
xh = ω − c[




(2bhH − b − Ht0 − Hc)(2bhH + b + Ht0 + Hc)
16H2 + xh}.
(2.9)
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16H2 + ω −




which is a constant, so that Uu (t0) is linear.
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0 + t0,1)] + Πmu (t0,1) + t0x0 (pu
0 + t0,1).
(2.12)
Given the quasi-linear structure of preferences, the ﬁrst term in the last equation of (2.12)
is the consumer surplus resulting from the monopolist’s proﬁt maximizing choice. Thus,
the Marshallian surplus Mu(t0) is the sum of consumer surplus, the government’s tax
revenue, and the proﬁt of the monopolist when the monopoly is subject to a unit tax.
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2.3. The case of ad valorem taxation and personalized lump-sum transfers.
Now suppose that the monopoly commodity is taxed in an ad valorem manner, with










0 − cq] (2.13)




2H(1+τ0) .9 Note that for the proﬁt maximizing






Consider an exactly same economy as in the previous section with government being
able to do personalized lump-sum transfers, but with the monopolist facing an ad valorem
tax on his good. Let the incomes consumer receive in this ad valorem economy be denoted
by  Rh . An equilibrium can be deﬁned exactly as in the unit tax case. A harmless
normalization q = 1 can be adopted and the set of equilibria are fully parametrized by the
H variables τ0, R1,...,RH−1. Exactly as in the above section, we can also deﬁne Ua (τ0),
the frontier of equilibrium utility proﬁles of this economy that are made possible when τ0
is ﬁxed and,













the Marshallian surplus corresponding to τ0.
2.4. Unit vs ad valorem: the case of personalized lump-sum transfers.
As demonstrated out by Suits and Musgrave [1955], for every unit tax t0 there exists
an equivalent ad valorem tax that results in the monopolist choosing the same level of the
output (and conversely). This is obtained by solving the following for τ0:
x0(Pu
0 (t0,q) + t0,q) = x0(Pa
0 (τ0,q)(1 + τ0),q) (2.16)
With q = 1 this implies
b − Hc − Ht0
4
=
b − Hc(1 + τ0)
4
(2.17)





9 It is easy to check that the problem yields the proﬁt maximizing quantity and proﬁts of the monopolist
as well as the consumer price as ya
0 = x0 (q0,q) =
b−Hcq(1+τ0)
4 , Πma (t0,q) =
(b−Hcq(1+τ0))
2
8H(1+τ0) , and q0 =
b+Hcq(1+τ0)
2H .
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Since the proﬁt maximizing outputs of the monopolist are the same under both t0 and its
equivalent ad valorem tax, the demands for the numeraire by the monopolist as an input
are also equal in the two scenarios. This means that the amounts of the numeraire left
that can be potentially distributed to consumers are also same under t0 and the equivalent
ad valorem tax.
Clearly: when the government can do unrestricted transfers of the numeraire between
consumers, each equilibrium allocation under a unit tax is also attainable as an equilibrium
allocation under the equivalent ad valorem tax and

































where y0 is the output level chosen by the monopolist when faced with t0 and pa
0 is the
proﬁt maximizing price for the equivalent ad valorem tax rate t0
c .
(2.20) says that: the sums of monopoly proﬁt and tax revenue are the same when the
monopolist faces a unit or an equivalent ad valorem tax, although for a positive tax on the
monopolist, the monopoly proﬁt under unit taxation is larger than under an equivalent ad
valorem tax, while the tax revenue under unit taxation is smaller than under an equivalent
ad valorem tax. The reverse is true if t0 is negative.
Since consumer surplus is the same under t0 and its equivalent ad valorem tax, (2.20),






This demonstrates the welfare equivalence of unit and ad valorem taxation of a monopoly
in the case when government can do personalized lump-sum transfers.
2.5. The optimal tax on monopoly with personalized lump-sum transfers.
The optimal tax on the monopoly good is obtained by choosing the tax rate that
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(2bhH − b − Ht0 − Hc)(2bhH + b + Ht0 + Hc)
16H2 −
c[b − Hc − Ht0]
4
. (2.23)






Given (2.5) and (2.4), we ﬁnd that: the Pareto optimal unit tax on a monopolist when the
government can implement personalized lumpsum transfers is
∗
t 0 < 0. Further, at this tax
rate, the consumer price ∗ q0 of the monopoly good is equal to the marginal cost c of the
monopolist.
Thus, as in Guesnerie and Laﬀont [1978], the optimal tax on the monopolist when the
government can implement personalized lump-sum transfers is a subsidy that leads him to
choose a level of monopoly output that corresponds to the level in a perfectly competitive
economy: in this economy, the distortion created by a monopoly can be fully corrected by
subsidizing the monopolist.















2.6. Reconciliation with Skeath and Trandel [1994].
Skeath and Trandel [1994] argue that for every unit tax on a monopolist there exists
an ad valorem tax that yields a higher consumer surplus, a higher monopoly proﬁts, and
also a higher tax revenue to the government. Note the following with respect to their
argument:
(1) Their proof for the existence of such an ad valorem tax rate holds only if the gov-
ernment can implement positive rates of taxation. The revealed preference argument
employed will fail if the tax rate is negative.
(2.) The discussion above reveals that if for every unit tax t0 > 0 there exists an ad valorem
tax, say τ0 > 0, that yields a higher Marshallian surplus, then there is also a unit tax
¯ t0 = cτ0 > 0 that is equivalent to τ0 that yields a higher Marshallian surplus than t0.
We can continue the argument further and establish that there exists also a unit tax
and an equivalent ad valorem that yield a higher Marshallian surplus than ¯ t0. This
argument can go on for ever if we conﬁne ourselves to positive rates of taxation. This
is because in this partial equilibrium framework based on Marshallian surplus, the
optimal rate of taxation on the monopolist is negative. Thus, every positive unit tax
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will always be Pareto dominated by another positive unit and an equivalent positive
ad valorem tax.
(3) At the Pareto optimal unit tax (which is negative) there exists no ad valorem tax
that can yield a higher Marshallian surplus. There however exists an equivalent ad
valorem tax that yields the same Marshallian surplus.
Thus, we reconcile the arguments of Skeath and Trandel [1994] with our arguments
above on the equivalence of unit and ad valorem taxation of a monopoly with respect to
the Marshallian surplus.
2.7. The problem with private ownership with no personalized lump-sum transfers.
Now consider economies with taxation of the monopoly good, where consumers re-
ceive a share of the monopoly proﬁts, the aggregate endowment, ω, of the numeraire
commodity is held by the consumers according to a distribution  ωh , and where govern-
ment redistributes its tax revenue as uniform lumpsum transfers (That is, each consumer
receives 1/H of the government deﬁcit or surplus.). Suppose the share of consumer h in
the monopoly proﬁt is θh ∈ [0,1] with
 
h θh = 1. Consumer h’s income is composed of his
proﬁt income, the lump-sum transfer from the government, and his endowment income.
A unit tax equilibrium in this private ownership economy with proﬁt shares θ =  θh  is
given by
x0(pu











+ qωh, ∀ h.
(2.27)




0 + t0,q,wh) = ω − cyu
0. (2.28)
(2.27) is a system of 2+H equations in 4+H unknowns pu
0,yu
0,q,t0,w1,...,wH. The system
is homogeneous of degree zero in pu
0,q,t0,w1,...,wH and so admits the normalization
q = 1. Hence, eﬀectively, there is one degree of freedom in choosing equilibria, that is the
set of equilibria of this θ ownership economy can be parametrized by the variable t0 such
that (2.5) holds. The equilibrium values of pu
0,yu
0,w1,...,wH are (uniquely) determined
once t0 is ﬁxed. Precisely, they are
pu
0 =








(b − Hc − Ht0)
8H
[θh(b − Hc − Ht0) + 2t0] + ωh ∀ h.
(2.29)
Similarly too we can deﬁne an ad valorem tax equilibrium, where τ0 is the ad valorem
tax rate and pa
0 = q0/(1 + τ0) is the producer price faced by the monopolist under the ad









0 + ωh, (2.30)
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with pa
0 = Pa








As in Blackorby and Murty [2007], (2.20) and (2.18) can be used to show that, in
an economy where monopoly proﬁt is taxed at 100% and rebated back to the consumers
as uniform lumpsum transfers, a unit tax equilibrium has an equivalent ad valorem tax
representation and vice-versa.10 Hence, the set of equilibrium allocations are the same
under both the tax systems, and this implies that the two taxes are equivalent in terms of
individual well-being.
However, when monopoly proﬁts are not taxed and there is private ownership of
the monopoly, then the switch from unit to an equivalent ad valorem tax (or vice-versa)
implies that the incomes of the consumers, in general, change because of the diﬀerence in
the composition of proﬁt income and the uniform lumpsum transfer from the government11:
if t0  = 0 and θh  = 1
H for all h, then we have

















In terms of consumer demands (given quasi-linear preferences which are linear in the
numeraire good),
xh(q0,1,wh)  = xh(q0,1,Rh), ∀h. (2.33)






and the consumer demands for the monopoly good, which are not subject to income
eﬀects, also remain the same in this switch. The above implies that although the aggregate
demands remain unchanged in the switch from unit to the equivalent ad valorem tax, the
individual demands for the numeraire good and, hence, the utilities of consumers change
as do the set of equilibrium allocations.12 Thus, the issue of dominance cannot be studied
directly.
10 The income distribution achieved at a unit-tax equilibrium of such an economy is also achieved by
implementing the equivalent ad valorem tax. In particular, the income distribution achieved is the same
as the one achieved in a private ownership economy with a demogrant, where the share θh of any consumer
h is 1
H. (In such private ownership economies, at a unit tax and its equivalent ad valorem tax equilibria,
we have  wh  =  Rh .)
11 Unless θh = 1
H for all h. This case is theoretically equivalent to the case of 100% taxation of proﬁts.
12 For more general preference structures, the switch may not even result in an equilibrium allocation.
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2.8. A sketch of the solution for the case of private ownership with no personalized lump-
sum transfers.
In order to be able to make a comparison of the two tax regimes in the general case
(as well as for the example above) we proceed in an indirect manner which ultimately
yields results. Consider the move from unit-taxation to ad valorem taxation as the reverse
is more or less the same. At every unit-tax equilibrium of a given private ownership
economy, the equivalent ad valorem tax leads to the same production decision by the
monopolist. However, as discussed above, under this ad valorem tax, the given allocation
of proﬁt shares results in diﬀerent distributions of consumer incomes and hence diﬀerent
consumption decisions.
We proceed in the following manner. First, for each private ownership economy
θ =  θh  with H consumers (that is, for each possible allocation of shares to the consumers),
we deﬁne the unit-tax utility possibility set (UPSu(θ)) as the set of all utility proﬁles
corresponding to all possible unit-tax equilibria of the given private ownership economy.
We construct the utility possibility frontier (UPFu(θ)) by maximizing the utility of one
consumer holding the utilities of all other consumers ﬁxed and subject to equilibrium
conditions for unit-taxation in the given private-ownership economy. Next we construct
the outer envelope of these utility possibility frontiers. That is, for each feasible ﬁxed level
of utilities for persons 2 through H, we maximize, by choosing the allocation of private








11Unit Versus Ad Valorem Taxes: Private Ownership and GE.Monopoly. November 13, 2010
Picking a particular ﬁxed set of shares, say ¯ θ =  ¯ θh , we then search along this
unit-tax envelope to see if there is a point on it that is also supported as an equilibrium
of ¯ θ private-ownership ad valorem economy. Under one set of regularity conditions we
show such a point (a vector of consumers’ utilities), say ¯ u =  ¯ uh , exists by a ﬁxed-point
argument (see Figure 2.) Since ¯ u lies on the unit envelope, there exists a share proﬁle,
say ¯ ψ =   ¯ ψh , such that the Pareto frontier of the corresponding unit-tax economy is
tangent to the unit envelope at ¯ u. We show that under our regularity conditions, at ¯ u,
the consumer incomes and equilibrium prices and quantities in the ad valorem and unit
economies are the same. However, we ﬁnd that ¯ ψ is not equal to ¯ θ and that ¯ u never belongs
to the utility possibility set of the ¯ θ ownership unit economy unless the shares in ¯ θ were
all equal to 1/H (and hence equivalent to one hundred per cent proﬁt taxation problem
that was solved in Blackorby and Murty [2007]) or the optimal tax on the monopolist
happened to be equal to zero. In this way, we obtain a point in the utility possibility set
of a ¯ θ private-ownership economy with ad valorem taxes which is not present in the utility
possibility set of a ¯ θ private-ownership economy with unit taxes, demonstrating that unit
taxation does not dominate ad valorem when the monopoly is privately owned. (Figure 2









¯ u ∈ UPSa(¯ θ), ¯ u ∈ UPFu( ¯ ψ), ¯ u / ∈ UPSu(¯ θ)
The converse is proved in a similar way under another similar set of regularity con-
straints by searching for a unit-tax equilibrium along the ad valorem-tax envelope for a
given allocation of shares. If both our sets of regularity constraints hold simultaneously
then, taken together, these results substantiate the claim that neither tax system Pareto-
dominates the other.
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2.9. Implementing the solution in the case of quasi-linear preferences and constant
marginal cost.
For the quasi-linear example studied in Section 2.7, it was found that set of equilib-
ria corresponding to any θ =  θh  private ownership economy with unit taxation of the
monopoly good and uniform lump-sum transfer is fully parametrized by t0, where t0 satis-
ﬁes (2.5). Precisely, the parametrization was derived in (2.29). This means that there is a
tax equilibrium in this economy that corresponds to the ﬁrst-best optimal tax
∗
t 0 = cH−b
H .
The independence of the demands for the monopoly good from incomes of consumers under
quasi-linear preference structures implies that the demands for the monopoly good as well
as the demand by the monopolist for the numeraire commodity as input at the private-
ownership tax equilibrium will also be the demands at the ﬁrst-best. This implies that the
tax equilibrium allocation of the θ private-ownership economy corresponding to
∗
t 0 is also
ﬁrst-best Pareto optimal, in other words, there is a point on the utility possibility frontier
UPFu(θ) that is tangent to UFB. This is true for every θ private ownership economy,
where θh ∈ [0,1] for all h and
 
h θh = 1. Clearly, from this argument it follows that:
in the example with quasi-linear preferences, the unit-tax envelope is a subset of UFB.
Using exactly the same argument, we also claim that: in the example with quasi-linear
preferences, the ad valorem-tax envelope is a subset of UFB.
Further, we also ﬁnd that: quasi-linear preferences imply that the unit-tax envelope
is a subset of the ad valorem-tax envelope. This can be veriﬁed by looking at the ranges
of values that the utility of each consumer h takes along the unit-tax envelope and the
ad-valorem tax envelope. Consider the unit-tax envelope. Since the demands for the
monopoly good, the input demand for the numeraire by the monopolist, and the unit
tax are ﬁxed at the ﬁrst-best levels at every point on it, the monopoly proﬁts and the
demogrant are equal along all these points. The utility level of any consumer h varies
along this envelope precisely because his income varies–as his proﬁt share varies from zero
to one–along this envelope.
For every h, let the range of utility levels along the ad-valorem envelope be denoted by
uh ∈ [uh
u, ¯ uh
u].13 Similarly, for every h, let the range of utility levels along the ad-valorem
envelope be denoted by uh ∈ [uh
a, ¯ uh
a].14 The upper-bounds correspond to the case where
h’s proﬁt share is one, while the lower bounds correspond to the case where h’s proﬁt share
is zero. The precise relation between the ﬁrst-best frontier and the unit-tax and the ad
valorem-tax envelopes is shown in Figure 3.




























































































The case of quasi linear preferences: the ﬁrst-best frontier and the unit and ad valorem
envelopes
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a], then we ﬁnd that15
¯ uh
u − ¯ uh
a =
∗



























a] for all h.
Intuitively, this is true because
∗
t 0 < 0, so that from (2.20) it follows that the de-
mogrant under ad valorem taxation is smaller than under unit taxation, while the proﬁts
are larger under ad valorem taxation. Thus, for θh = 0 (respectively, θh = 1), when the
consumer receives only demogrant (respectively, proﬁt) income, apart, of course, from his
endowment income, his income and hence utility is larger (respectively, smaller) under the
unit tax than under the equivalent ad valorem tax. Precisely, this implies that the regu-
larity condition (mentioned in the previous subsection and called Assumption 6 later in
the general case), which is required to prove that ad valorem taxation does not dominate
unit taxation, holds for this example.16 The solution outlined in the previous section for
welfare comparison of unit and ad valorem taxation under private ownership can now be
employed in this example. Pick any proﬁle of valid proﬁt share-proﬁle θ. A search along
the ad valorem envelope will yield a utility proﬁle ¯ u that also corresponds to an equilibrium
in a θ private ownership economy with unit taxation. This is precisely because the unit
envelope is a subset of the ad valorem envelope. Arguments made in the previous section
while explaining the solution in the general case follow to show that ad valorem taxation
does not dominate unit taxation in private ownership economies.
Further, a search along the unit envelope for a utility proﬁle that corresponds to
an equilibrium in an ad valorem private ownership economy with share-proﬁle θ may or
may not be successful as the unit envelope is a subset of the ad valorem envelope. If
successful, the arguments outlined in the solution provided in the previous section apply.
If not, then too the utility proﬁle that lies on the ad valorem envelope and corresponds
to a private ownership economy with share-proﬁle θ is not attainable in a unit private
ownership economy with share-proﬁle θ unless θh = 1
H for all h. This demonstrates that
unit taxation does not dominate ad valorem taxation in private ownership economies.
15 To sign these expressions, note that (2.18) implies 1+τ0 = c+t0
c , which in turn implies that c+t0 > 0.
16 For every consumer h and given any share of proﬁt θh ∈ [0,1], the income associated with an equivalent
unit tax at any point on the ad valorem envelope lies between the incomes h receives under ad valorem
taxation at the two end points of the ad valorem frontier corresponding to shares zero and one.
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2.10. Issues with extension to more general economies.
The example studied above restricted focus to the case of quasi-linear preferences and
did not allow for taxation of the numeraire good. In more general economies, the relations
between the ﬁrst-best frontier and the unit-tax and ad valorem-tax envelopes may be more
general. With more general preferences, the demands for the monopoly good will not be
independent of consumer incomes and hence will vary along the ﬁrst-best frontier. This
implies that, even if there are common instruments that parametrize tax equilibria in both
economies with personalized lump-sum transfers and economies with private-ownership17,
the utility proﬁles obtained at a private-ownership tax equilibrium may be diﬀerent from
the one obtained at the ﬁrst-best for the same set of values of these instruments. This
is because the income proﬁles associated with these instrument values may diﬀer in the
two equilibria in more general economies.18 This may imply that a second-best utility
possibility frontier corresponding to a private-ownership economy with taxation of the
monopoly good may not be tangent to the ﬁrst-best frontier, i.e., the unit-tax (or the ad
valorem-tax) envelope may not be a subset of the ﬁrst-best frontier. Further, it could also
be the case that neither of the two envelopes is a subset of the other.19
3. The general case: Description of the economy.
Consider an economy where H is the index set of consumers who are indexed by h.
The cardinality of H is H. There are N + 1 goods, of which the good indexed by 0 is the
monopoly good. The remaining goods are produced by competitive ﬁrms.
The aggregate technology of the competitive sector is Y c,20 the technology of the
monopolist is Y 0 = {(y0,ym)|y0 ≤ Fm(ym)}, where ym ∈ RN
+ is its vector of input
demands and the technology of the public sector for producing g units of a public good
is Y g(g) = {yg ∈ RN
+| F(yg) ≥ g}. For all h ∈ H, the gross consumption set is Xh ⊆
RN+1. The aggregate endowment is denoted by (ω0,ω) ∈ RN+1
++ and is distributed among
consumers as  ωh
0,ωh .21 For all h ∈ H, a gross consumption bundle is denoted by (xh
0,xh),
and uh denotes the utility function deﬁned over the gross consumption set. The production
bundle of the competitive sector is denoted by yc, of the public sector by yg, and of the
monopolist by (y0,ym).
17 As we saw in the quasi-linear case, where the tax on the monopoly good, t0, was the common
instrument.
18 For example, in a two-good case with general preferences, unit-for-unit transfers between consumers
of the amount of the non-monopoly good available at a ﬁrst-best that corresponds to these instrument
values may not be feasible due to income eﬀects such transfers generate. This is unlike in the example
with quasi-linear preferences.
19 See a working paper version of this paper, Blackorby and Murty [2008], for the relative positions of
the ﬁrst-best frontier and the unit and ad valorem envelopes for the general case.
20 Aggregate proﬁt maximization in this sector is consistent with individual proﬁt maximization by
many diﬀerent ﬁrms, as we assume away production externalities.
21 Any H dimensional vector of variables pertaining to all H consumers such as (u1,...,uH) is denoted
by  uh .
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The economy is summarized by E = ( ωh
0,ωh , Xh,uh ,Y 0,Y c,Y g). An allocation




. A private ownership economy
is one where the consumers own shares in the proﬁts of both the competitive and monopoly
ﬁrms. A proﬁle of consumer shares in aggregate proﬁts is given by  θh  ∈ ∆H−1.22 The
consumer price of the monopoly good is q0 ∈ R++, q ∈ RN
++ is the vector of consumer
prices of the competitively supplied goods. The wealth of consumer h is given by wh. The
producer price of the monopoly good is p0 ∈ R++, p ∈ RN
+ is the vector of producer prices
of the competitively supplied goods. The individual and aggregate consumer demands for
the monopoly good are given by





and the individual and aggregate consumer demand vectors for the competitively supplied
commodities are given by




The indirect utility function of consumer h is denoted by V h(q0,q,wh).23 We assume
that the monopolist is naive, in the sense that it does not take into account the eﬀect of
its decision on consumer incomes.24 Its cost and input demand functions are denoted by
C(y0,p) and ym(y0,p), respectively. The aggregate competitive proﬁt and supply functions
are denoted by Πc(p) and yc(p), respectively. We use the following general assumptions
on preferences and technologies in our analysis.
Assumption 1: For all h ∈ H, the gross consumption set is Xh = RN+1
+ , the utility
function uh is increasing, strictly quasi-concave, and twice continuously diﬀerentiable in
the interior of its domain Xh. This, in turn, implies that the indirect utility function V h is
twice continuously diﬀerentiable.25 We also assume that the demand functions (xh
0(),xh())
are twice continuously diﬀerentiable on the interior of their domain.
Assumption 2: The technologies Y 0, Y c, and Y g(g) are closed, convex, satisfy free
disposability. Y 0 and Y c contain the origin. The public good production function F is
strictly concave and twice continuously diﬀerentiable on the interior of its domain.
Assumption 3: The proﬁt function of the competitive sector, Πc, is assumed to be
diﬀerentially strongly convex and the cost function C(y0,p) of the monopolist is assumed
22 ∆H−1 is the H − 1-dimensional unit simplex. Assuming that consumers have the same shares of
monopoly and competitive sectors’ proﬁts makes the notation considerably simpler without any loss of
generality.
23 There is also a public good g but, as it remains constant throughout the analysis, it is suppressed in
the utility function.
24 Likewise we assume that consumers are naive; they do not anticipate changes in theirs incomes due
to change in the proﬁts of the monopolist.
25 See Blackorby and Diewert [1979].
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to be diﬀerentially strongly concave in prices and increasing and convex in output.26 The
competitive supply yc(p) is given by Hotelling’s Lemma as ∇pΠc(p) and the input demands
of the monopolist are given by ym(y0,p) = ∇pC(y0,p). The marginal cost ∇y0C(y0,p) is
positive on the interior of the domain of C.
3.1. A unit-tax private-ownership equilibrium.
The monopolist’s optimization problem, when facing a unit tax t0 ∈ R and when the
vector of unit taxes on the competitive goods is t ∈ RN, is
Pu




0   x0 (pu
0 + t0,p + t, wh ) − C (x0(pu




As discussed in detail in Guesnerie and Laﬀont [1978] the proﬁt function of the monopo-
list (the function over which it optimizes) is not in general concave. Following them we
assume that the solution to monopolist’s proﬁt maximization problem is locally unique
and smooth. Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, the ﬁrst-order condition for this problem is
∇q0x0 (pu
0 + t0,p + t, wh ) [pu
0 − ∇y0C(y0,p)] + x0(pu
0 + t0,p + t, wh ) = 0 (3.4)
which implicitly deﬁnes the solution pu
0 = Pu
0 (p,t0,t, wh ).
Assumption 4: Pu
0 is single-valued and twice continuously diﬀerentiable function such
that
∇t0Pu
0 (p,t0,t, wh )  = −1. (3.5)
As discussed in Guesnerie and Laﬀont [1978], ∇t0Pu
0  = −1 implies that the government
can control q0 by controlling t0. Since consumer demands are homogeneous of degree
zero in consumer prices and incomes, ∇q0x0 is homogeneous of degree minus one in these
variables. Also, the cost function C is homogeneous of degree one in p. Hence, it follows
that the left side of (3.4) is homogeneous of degree zero in pu
0,p,t0,t, and  wh . This
implies that the function Pu
0 (p,t0,t, wh ) is homogeneous of degree one in p,t0,t, and
 wh .
A unit-tax equilibrium in private-ownership economy with shares  θh  ∈ ∆H−1 is
given by27
−x(q0,q, wh ) + yc(p) − ym(yu
0,p) − yg + ω ≥ 0, (3.6)
−x0 (q0,q, wh ) + yu
0 + ω0 ≥ 0, (3.7)
pu
0 − Pu
0 (p,t0,t, wh ) = 0, (3.8)
wh = θh [pu
0yu
0 − C(yu




tT(yc − ym − yg) + t0yu
0 − pyg
 
+ qTωh + q0ωh
0, ∀h ∈ H
(3.9)
and
F(yg) − g ≥ 0, pu
0 ≥ 0, p ≥ 0N, q0 = pu
0 + t0 ≥ 0,q = p + t ≥ 0N. (3.10)
26 See Avriel, Diewert, Schaible, and Zang [1988].
27 The superscript notation T stands for transpose. A matrix with subscript N is a square matrix with
dimension N.
18Unit Versus Ad Valorem Taxes: Private Ownership and GE.Monopoly. November 13, 2010
3.2. An ad valorem-tax private-ownership equilibrium.
The monopolist’s proﬁt maximization problem, when confronted with ad valorem taxes
(τ0,τ) is28
Pa


















0 is a single valued twice continuously diﬀerentiable function; Assumption
4 then implies that (1 + τ0)∇τ0Pa
0  = −Pa
0 .
A monopoly ad-valorem tax equilibrium in a private ownership economy with shares
 θh  ∈ ∆H−1 satisﬁes
−x(q0,q, Rh ) + yc(p) − ym(p,ya
0) − yg + ω ≥ 0, (3.12)
−x0 (q0,q, Rh ) + ya
0 + ω0 ≥ 0, (3.13)
pa
0 = Pa
0 (p,τ0,τ, Rh ), (3.14)









0 + pTτ τ τ [yc − yg − ym] − pTyg
 
+ qTωh + q0ωh
0 ∀h ∈ H,
(3.15)
F(yg) − g ≥ 0, (3.16)
and
pa
0 ≥ 0, p ≥ 0N, q0 = pa
0(1 + τ0) ≥ 0, q = (IN +τ τ τ)p ≥ 0N. (3.17)
As in the unit-tax case, the function Pa
0 is homogeneous of degree one in its arguments.
4. Unit versus ad valorem taxes in private ownership economies.
This section consists of two subsections. In the ﬁrst we set out the assumptions and
notation that we need and then show that the set of unit-tax Pareto optima for a given
private-ownership economy does not contain the set of ad-valorem tax Pareto optima for
the same private ownership economy. Hence, unit taxation does not dominate ad valorem
taxation. The following subsection proves the converse.
28 Symbols in bold face such as τ τ τ and p stand for diagonal matrices with diagonal elements being the
elements of vectors τ and p, respectively.
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4.1. An ad valorem-tax private-ownership equilibrium on the envelope of unit-tax utility
possibility frontiers
For each possible proﬁle of proﬁt shares,  θh  ∈ ∆H−1, we obtain a unit-tax Pareto
frontier by solving the following problem for all utility proﬁles (u2,...,uH) for which
solution exists:





V h(q0,q,wh) ≥ uh, for h = 2,...,H,
and (3.6) to (3.10).
(4.1)
The envelope for the Pareto manifolds of all possible private ownership economies
with unit taxes (which we will call the unit envelope) is obtained by solving the following







θh = 1, and θh ∈ [0,1],∀ h ∈ H.
(4.2)








That is, for given utility levels, (u2,...,uH),  
∗
θu
h  is the vector of shares that maximizes
the utility of consumer 1.
Next we generate an algorithm that identiﬁes the ad valorem tax-equilibria that lie
on the unit envelope.
Let Au be the set of all allocations corresponding to the utility proﬁles on the
unit envelope ˆ Uu(u2,...,uh). Deﬁne the identity mapping I : Au → Au with image
( xh
0(z),xh(z) ,y0(z),ym(z),yc(z),yg(z)) = z.29
Let ρu : Au → RH with image ρu(z) =  uh(xh
0(z),xh(z))  be a utility map of the
allocations in Au. That is, for every z ∈ Au, the set of utility levels enjoyed by consumers
at that allocation is ρu(z).




h(ρu(z)) for h ∈ H be the solution of the
problem (4.2) at the allocation z.
Our strategy is based on a ﬁxed point argument and requires the restriction that all
prices and taxes belong to a compact and convex set. A natural way to do so is to adopt




∈ Au, the mapping I assigns  xh
0(z),xh(z)  =
 xh
0,xh , yc(z) = yc,yg(z) = yg,y0(z) = y0, and ym(z) = ym.
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a price normalization rule, which the equilibrium system allows as it is homogeneous of
degree zero in the variables.30 Let b be such a normalization rule such that the set
Su
b := {(p0,t0,p,t) ∈ R+ × R × RN
+ × RN| b(p0,t0,p,t, wh ) = 0 for any  wh  } (4.4)
is compact. Let (¯ pu
0,¯ t0, ¯ p,¯ t  and (pu
0,t0,p,t) be the vectors of maximum and minimum
values attained by pu
0,t0,p, and t in Su
b . For example, ¯ pu
0 solves
max {pu
0 ∈ R+| ∃t0,p,t, wh  such that b(pu
0,p,t0,t, wh ) = 0}. (4.5)
Deﬁne the mapping ψu : Au → Su





0(z),t0(z),p(z),t(z)) is the vector of unit taxes and producer prices associated with
allocation z (a unit tax equilibrium), while ψu
w(z) =  wh(z)  is the proﬁle of consumer
incomes associated with allocation z. Under Assumptions 1 to 4, ψu is continuous. For
every z ∈ Au, q0(z) = pu
0(z)+t0(z) and q(z) = p(z)+t(z). Since Su
b is compact, there exist
(¯ q0, ¯ q  and (q0,q) which denote the vector of maximum and minimum possible consumer
prices that can be attained under the adopted price normalization rule.
Given (i) an appropriate normalization rule and (ii) the fact that, for a monopolist,
pu
0(z) ≥ ∇y0C(y0(z),p(z)), we have, for every z ∈ Au,
p(z) ∈ [p, ¯ p], pu
0(z) ∈ [pu
0, ¯ pu






Next, we use Suits and Musgrave [1953] argument to show that we can separate q(z)
and q0(z) into (equivalent) ad valorem taxes and producer prices deﬁned by functions
(τ0(z),τ(z)) and (pa
0(z),p(z)), which ensure that (y0(z),y(z)) and (pa
0(z),p(z)) are the
proﬁt maximizing outputs and prices in the monopoly and the competitive sector when
the ad valorem taxes are (τ0(z),τ(z)), that is, (τ0(z),τ(z)) and (pa
0(z),p(z)) solve
q0(z) = pa








q(z) = (τ τ τ(z) + IN)p(z).
(4.8)




30 The rationale for this including a discussion of valid normalization rules and a proof that their choice
does not aﬀect the solution (Lemma B3) is in Appendix B (Blackorby and Murty [2008]) of the working
paper version.
31 Note, normalization rules such as the unit hemisphere ensure that ∇y0C(y0(z),p(z)) lies in a compact
set when the monopolist optimizes. This is because, under such a normalizaton, pu
0 = 0 and hence,
∇y0C ≥ pu
0 = 0.
32 See also Blackorby and Murty [2007].
















Deﬁne the mapping ψa
p(z) := (pa
0(z),τ0(z),p(z),τ(z)). ψa
p identiﬁes the (equivalent)
ad valorem taxes and prices associated with an allocation z ∈ Au that results in the same
output decisions as in the unit tax equilibrium.
Since τ0(z) and pa
0(z) are continuous functions, (4.10)–(4.12) imply that there exist
compact intervals [τ0, ¯ τ0], [τ, ¯ τ], and [pa
0, ¯ pa
0] such that for every z ∈ Au, we have
τ0(z) ∈ [τ0, ¯ τ0], (4.13)






















× [τ, ¯ τ], (4.16)
and for every z ∈ Au, we have (p0(z),τ0(z),p(z),τ(z)) ∈ Su
b, which is a compact and
convex set.
For each allocation z ∈ Au we need to be able to identify the incomes of the consumers.
Deﬁne an income map for consumer h as the map ruh : Au × Su
b × [0,1] → R, which for
every z ∈ Au, π = (pu
0,t0,p,t) ∈ Su
b , and θh ∈ [0,1] has image
ruh(z,π,θh) =θh [pu




t0y0(z) + tT[yc(z) − ym(z) − yg(z))] − pTyg(z)
 




33 If (4.9) is not satisﬁed then there is no ad valorem tax that that yields the same proﬁt-maximizing
output as the given unit tax t0(z), for as seen in the equation immediately below, violation of (4.9) would
imply that pa
0(z) is either less than zero or does not exist.



















t0(z)y0(z) + tT(z)[yc(z) − ym(z) − yg(z))] − pT(z)yg(z)
 
+ [p(z) + t(z)]Tω + [pu
0(z) + t0(z)]ω0
= q0(z)y0(z) − q(z)Tym(z) + q(z)Tyc(z) − qT(z)yg(z) + qT(z)ω + q0(z)ω0
(4.18)
For all h ∈ H let rah : Au × Su















0(z)y0(z) + τT(z)p(z)[yc(z) − ym(z) − yg(z))] − pT(z)yg(z)
 




The maps  rah  generate the incomes of consumers at any allocation z ∈ Au using the
equivalent ad valorem price-tax conﬁguration and arbitrary ownership shares  θh . Note
that since pa
0(z)(1+τ0(z)) = pu
0(z)+t0(z) = q0(z) and pa(z)(1+τ(z)) = p(z)+t(z) = q(z),

















0(z)y0(z) + τT(z)p(z)[yc(z) − ym(z) − yg(z)] − pT(z)yg(z)
 
+ (τ τ τ(z) + IN)p(z)ω + pa
0(z)(1 + τ0(z))ω0













This demonstrates that the aggregate income at allocation z under unit-taxation and
income rule  θu
h(z)  is the same as the aggregate income at z with equivalent ad valorem
taxes and any income rule  θh .
For all z ∈ Au, denote the monopoly and competitive proﬁts and government revenues










Gu(z) = t0(z)y0(z) + tT(z)[yc(z) − ym(z) − yg(z)] − pT(z)yg(z), and
Ga(z) = pa
0(z)τ0(z)y0(z) + pT(z)τ τ τ(z)[yc(z) − ym(z) − yg(z)] − pT(z)yg(z).
(4.21)
34 Recall that q0(z) = pu
0(z) + t0(z) and q(z) = p(z) + t(z).
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From (4.20), we note that, at z ∈ Au, the sums of proﬁt and government revenue are
the same under the unit and ad valorem systems, that is,
Πmu(z) + Πc(z) + Gu(z) = Πma(z) + Πc(z) + Ga(z)
⇔ − [Πma(z) − Πmu(z)] = Ga(z) − Gu(z).
(4.22)
We calculate the following diﬀerence, recalling the Suits and Musgrave relation (4.10)













Remark 1: Since, under monopoly, ∇y0C(z) − pa
0(z) < 0, from (4.23) it follows that (i)
the unit demogrant is bigger than (smaller than, equal to) the ad valorem demogrant iﬀ
t0(z) < 0 (t0(z) > 0, t0(z) = 0) and (ii) the monopoly proﬁt under unit taxation is bigger
than (smaller than, equal to) the monopoly proﬁt under ad valorem taxation if and only
if t0(z) > 0 (t0(z) < 0, t0(z) = 0) .
Assumption 5: For every  θh  ∈ ∆H−1 and for every h ∈ H, there exist ¯ zh and zh in Au
such that ruh(¯ zh,ψu
p(¯ zh),θu
h(¯ zh)) − rah(¯ zh,ψa





The continuity of the function ruh(zh,ψu
p(zh),θu
h(zh)) − rah(zh,ψa
p(zh),θh) in z and
the intermediate value theorem imply that, for every h, there is a point in Au where its
income from unit taxation and the equivalent ad valorem taxation is the same.
Lemma 1: Let the mapping
∗
θu : ρu(Au) → ∆H−1 be a surjective function and As-





The following theorem proves the existence of an ad valorem equilibrium of a given
private ownership economy on the unit envelope. Fixing a vector of ownership shares,
say  θh , we search along the unit-tax envelope to see if there is a point on it that is
also supported as an equilibrium of a  θh  ownership ad valorem economy. The search
is facilitated by the fact that at each point  uh  on the unit-tax envelope, there is an
equivalent vector of ad valorem taxes and prices that results in the same output decisions.
Under Assumption 5, the continuity of the income maps  ruh  and  rah  implies that there
is a point on the unit-tax envelope where the corresponding unit taxes and the equivalent
ad valorem taxes result also in the same incomes to all consumers, and hence to the same
consumer demands.
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Theorem 1: Let E = ( (Xh,uh) ,Y 0,Y c,Y g, (ωh
0,ωh) ) be an economy. Fix the proﬁt
shares as  θh  and suppose the following are true:
(i) Assumptions 1 through 5 hold;
(ii) the mapping ρu : Au → ρu(Au) is bijective;
(iii) b is a normalization rule such that Su
b is compact, and the mapping ψa
p : Au → Su
b is
a continuous function;
(iv) Au is compact and ρu(Au) is a H − 1 dimensional manifold;






θu : ρu(Au) → ∆H−1 is a surjective function.
Then
(a) there exists a ∗ z ∈ Au such that ruh(∗ z,ψu
p(∗ z),θu
h(∗ z)) = rah(∗ z,ψa
p(∗ z),θh) for h ∈ H;
(b) ∗ z is also an allocation underlying an ad valorem tax equilibrium of the private own-
ership economy with shares  θh ;
(c) θu
h(∗ z) = θh for all h ∈ H if and only if θh = 1
H for all h ∈ H or t0(∗ z) = 0;
(d) ρu(∗ z) ∈ Uu( θh ) :=
 
 uh  ∈ RH|u1 ≤ Uu(u2,...,uH, θh )
 
if and only if θh = 1
H
for all h ∈ H or t0(∗ z) = 0.
Conclusions (a) and (b) of the above theorem imply that given a ownership proﬁle  θh 
there exists an allocation ∗ z such that ρu(∗ z) lies on the unit envelope and ∗ z is also supported
as an equilibrium of the ad valorem  θh  economy. (c) says that unless θh = 1
H for all h,
the private ownership unit economy that is tangent to the unit envelope at ∗ u = ρu(∗ z), is
not the same as the  θh  unit economy. (d) says that unless θh = 1
H for all h ∈ H, the
utility imputation ∗ u never belongs to the utility possibility frontier corresponding to the
 θh  unit economy. All these conclusions imply that (unless θh = 1
H for all h ∈ H) though
∗ u belongs to the utility possibility set corresponding to the  θh  ad valorem economy, it
does not belong to the utility possibility set corresponding to the  θh  unit economy.
4.2. A unit-tax private-ownership equilibrium on the envelope of ad valorem-tax utility
possibility frontiers.
Arguments for proving that, for any private ownership economy, the unit utility pos-
sibility set is not a subset of the ad valorem utility possibility set, are similar to the
ones in the previous section. The Pareto manifold for a private ownership economy with
ad valorem taxes can be derived in a manner similar to (4.1). We denote its image by
u1 = Ua(u2,...,uH, θh ) for shares  θh  ∈ ∆H−1. An envelope for all Pareto manifolds of
private ownership economies with ad valorem taxes (which we call the ad valorem envelope)
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θh = 1 and θh ∈ [0,1],∀h.
(4.25)
We denote the solution to this problem by  
∗
θa




Under a set of assumptions analogous to the ones in the previous subsection, a theorem
analogous to Theorem 1 can be proved to show that, for every allocation of shares  θh  ∈
∆H−1, there exists a unit-tax equilibrium of a  θh  ownership economy on the ad valorem-
tax envelope, and utility proﬁle corresponding to it will, generally (unless θh = 1
H for all
h or τ0 = 0), not belong to the utility possibility set corresponding to a  θh  ownership ad
valorem economy. In particular, Assumption 6 below (which, as was discussed in Section
2.9, is satisﬁed by our earlier quasi-linear example) is analogous to Assumption 5.35
Assumption 6: For every  θh  ∈ ∆H−1 and for every h ∈ H, there exist ¯ zh and zh in Aa
such that rah(¯ zh,ψ ψ ψa
p(¯ zh),θa
h(¯ zh)) − ruh(¯ zh,ψ ψ ψu






We show that the Marshallian social surpluses that result from unit and ad valorem
taxation of a monopoly, where the government can implement unrestricted transfers, are
identical.
If the government’s redistributive ability is constrained so that it can only implement
a uniform lump-sum transfer and there is private ownership of the monopoly then, we show
that under one set of regularity conditions unit taxation does not dominate ad valorem
taxation, while under another similar set of regularity conditions the reverse holds. In the
case of quasi-linear preferences, the latter regularity holds. In the case of more general
preferences, the possibility of both sets of regularity conditions holding simultaneously is
not ruled out, and so it could be the case that the set of second-best Pareto optima in a
unit-tax economy neither dominates the set of second-best ad valorem-tax Pareto optima
nor is dominated by it. In particular, if the shares in the private sector proﬁts are equal for
all consumers (which is equivalent to the case of one hundred per cent proﬁt taxation in
Blackorby and Murty [2007]) then the two sets of Pareto optima coincide. This conclusion
is at odds with most of the existing literature comparing unit and ad valorem taxation.
Earlier claims that equilibria in unit-tax economies are dominated by equilibria in
ad valorem-tax economies did not deal with the fact that the monopoly proﬁts must be
redistributed to consumers either via government taxation and lump-sum transfers or via
35 The functions rah, ruh, ψ ψ ψ
a
p, and ψ ψ ψ
u
p are analogous to the functions rah, ruh, ψa
p, and ψu
p in Assumption
5. The set Aa is analogous to the set Au.
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the private ownership of ﬁrms. Nevertheless, the move from a unit-tax equilibrium to an
ad valorem one is not simply an accounting identity as it is in a competitive economy.
6. Appendix A
This appendix contain the proofs of all of the theorems in the paper. Appendix B
(Blackorby and Murty [2008]) in the working paper version of this paper rationalizes some
of the assumptions in Theorems 1 and 2 in terms of the underlying primitives of the
problem in so far as possible.
Proof of Lemma 1: The proof follows from Assumption 5 and the intermediate value





Proof of Theorem 1:
Under the maintained assumptions, conclusions of Lemma 2 follow. For every h, pick
zh as deﬁned in Lemma 2.36 Renormalize the utility function uh such that uh(xh
0(zh),xh(zh)) =
0.





for every u = (u1,...,uH) ∈ ρu(Au) is a homeomorphism.37 Denote κ(ρu(Au)) by Ω.
Deﬁne the inverse of κ as K : Ω → ρu(Au).38
Deﬁne the correspondence T : Au × Su
b → Ω as
T(z,π) = {β ∈ Ω|βh = 0 if there exists h such that
ruh(z,π,θu
h(z))  = rah(z,π,θh)}.
(6.3)
We claim that T is non-empty, compact, convex valued, and upper-hemi continuous. It
is trivial to prove that T is nonempty and convex valued. We now show that it is upper-
hemi continuous, which implies that it is compact valued, given Assumptions (iii) and (iv).
Suppose (zv,πv) → (z,π) ∈ Au × Su
b and βv → β such that βv ∈ T(zv,πv) for all v. We
need to show that β ∈ T(z,π). If there exists h such that ruh(z,π,θu
h(z))−rah(z,π,θh)  = 0
then, by the deﬁnition of the mapping T, we have βh = 0. Without loss of generality,
assume ruh(z,π,θu
h(z))−rah(z,π,θh) > 0. Since the functions ruh(z,π,θu
h(z))−rah(z,π,θh)
are continuous for all h in z and π, there exists v′ such that for all v ≥ v′, we have
36 If this is not unique, choose one such zh.
37 See also Quinzii [1992], p. 51.
38 Its image is
K(α) = λ(α)α (6.2)
where λ(α) = max{λ ≥ 0|λα ∈ ρu(Au)}.
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ruh(zv,πv,θu
h(zv)) − rah(zv,πv,θh) > 0. Hence βhv = 0 for all v ≥ v′. Therefore βv → β
implies that βh = 0.
Deﬁne the correspondence K : Ω × Su
b → Ω × Su
b, as39
K(α,π) = (T(ρu−1(K(α)),π), Ψa
p(ρu−1(K(α)))). (6.4)
Under the maintained assumptions of this theorem, this correspondence is convex valued
and upper-hemi continuous. The Kakutani’s ﬁxed point theorem implies that there is a
ﬁxed point (∗ α, ∗ π  such that ∗ α ∈ T(ρu−1(K(∗ α)), ∗ π) and ∗ π ∈ Ψa
p(ρu−1(K(∗ α))).
Let ∗ z := ρu−1(K(∗ α)). Hence, ∗ z ∈ Au and it is unique (as ρu and K are bijective).
We now prove that
rah(∗ z, ∗ π,θh) = ruh(∗ z, ∗ π,θu
h(∗ z)), ∀h ∈ H. (6.5)
If there exists h such that
rah(∗ z, ∗ π,θh)  = ruh(∗ z, ∗ π,θu
h(∗ z)), (6.6)
then by the deﬁnition of the correspondence T, we have ∗ αh = 0. By the deﬁnition of the
homeomorphism K, this would imply ∗ uh = 0. As ρu is bijective, our utility normalization
implies that ∗ z = zh and hence rah(∗ z, ∗ π,θh) = ruh(∗ z, ∗ π,θu
h(∗ z)), which is a contradiction.
This proves (a).
The price and the ad valorem tax conﬁguration ψa
p(∗ z) = (pa
0(∗ z),τ0(∗ z),p(∗ z),τ(∗ z))
and the income conﬁguration  rah(∗ z,ψa
p(∗ z),θh)  deﬁne an ad valorem tax equilibrium
of the private ownership economy  θh , the underlying equilibrium allocation is ∗ z and
the consumer prices are (q0(∗ z),qT(∗ z)) = (pa
0(∗ z)[1 + τ0(∗ z)],pT(∗ z)[IN + τ τ τ(∗ z)]) = (pu
0(∗ z) +
tu
0(∗ z),p(∗ z) + t(∗ z)). This proves (b).
At ∗ z we know, from (4.20), that the sums of proﬁts and government revenue are the same
under the unit and ad valorem systems, that is
Πu(∗ z) + Gu(∗ z) = Πa(∗ z) + Ga(∗ z)
⇔ − [Πa(∗ z) − Πu(∗ z)] = Ga(∗ z) − Gu(∗ z).
(6.7)
From conclusion (a) we have for all h ∈ H
wh(∗ z) = θu
h(∗ z)[Πu(∗ z) + Πc(∗ z)] +
1
H





h(∗ z)Πu(∗ z) − θhΠa(∗ z) =
1
H
[Ga(∗ z) − Gu(∗ z)]
⇒θu
h(∗ z)Πu(∗ z) − θhΠa(∗ z) =
1
H
[Πu(∗ z) − Πa(∗ z)].
(6.8)
39 Note, ρu−1 is the inverse mapping corresponding to ρu.
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The last equality follows from (6.7). Hence, (6.8) implies that θu
h(∗ z) = θh for all h ∈ H iﬀ
θh = 1
H for all h ∈ H or Πu(∗ z) − Πa(∗ z) = 0. The latter is true when t0(∗ z) = 0. Thus, (c)
is true.
We now prove (d). Let ∗ u := ρu(∗ z).
If ∗ u ∈ Uu( θh ) := { uh  ∈ RH|u1 ≤ Uu(u2,...,uH, θh )}, then since ∗ u ∈ ρu(A), we
have, because of Assumption (vi), the unique solution to (4.2) as
∗
θu(∗ u) =  θh . (6.9)
From (c) this is true iﬀ θh = 1
H for all h ∈ H or t0(∗ z) = 0.
If θh = 1
H for all h ∈ H or t0(∗ z) = 0, then again (6.9) follows from (c), and we have
∗ u ∈ Uu( θh ) := { uh  ∈ H|u1 ≤ Uu(u2,...,uH, θh )}.
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